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Fulfilling A Promise: Extending A Cooling-off
Period to Retail Sales in General
By Michael B. Metzger and Dennis B. Wolkoff*
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of a "cooling-off" period during which a buyer may
cancel a sale without justification is not a new one. The gen-
esis of this concept was the Final Report of the English Com-
mittee on Consumer Protection (the "Molony Committee") pre-
sented to Parliament in 1962.1
In the United States the concept has gained some acceptance
through limited incorporation into the statutes of several states,2
model consumer legislation3 and the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code.4 With one exception,5 however, all major recognition of
the cooling-off period as a legitimate and desirable consumer
remedy has been confined within the narrow parameters of "di-
rect sales" (those made at some place other than the seller's
place of business, usually at the home of the buyer) on a credit
basis.6
The authors advocate extending this remedy to cover a
much broader range of consumer transactions.7 As a vehicle
for furthering discussion, the authors have drafted a proposal
* Mr. Metzger and Mr. Wolkoff are both assistant professors of
business law at the University of Indiana.
1. Comnvrrrns ON CoNsumER PRoTEcTIoN, FINAL REPORT, CdND.
No. 1781, at 171-74 (1962) [hereinafter cited as MOLONY REPORT].
2. See, e.g., IL. AnN. STAT. ch. 121- , § 262 B (Supp. 1974);
McH. Coim. LAws ANN. §§ 445.111-.117 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 73, H8 500-201 to -209 (1971).
3. MODEL CoNsumER CRErr ACT §§ 2.701, 2.703 (1973); NATIONAL
CoNsUMvE ACr §§ 2.501, 2.505 (First Final Draft 1970).
4. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDr CODE § 2.502.
5. NATIONAL CoNsUmER ACT § 2.505 (First Final Draft 1970).
This section extended a limited right to cancel "inside consumer ap-
proval transactions." Such transactions were defined in § 2.501 as "con-
suner transaction[s] initiated by the consumer and consummated at the
merchant's place of business in which the dollar amount the customer
pays, will pay, has paid or is obligated to pay exceeds fifty dollars."
The National Consumer Act has, however, been succeeded by the Model
Consumer Credit Act, which does not include a similar provision. The
National Consumer Law Center, which drafted both model acts, has
given no formal explanation for the omission, though it probably repre-
sents a bow to political practicality.
6. See, e.g., UNIFORM CoNsUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.501.
7. See Proposal § (1) in text accompanying note 35 infra.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
which exemplifies what is considered to be a desirable approach
to consumer remedies in this area. This Article will be divided
into two parts: first, an explanation of the reasons for such
a broad extension of the remedy; and second, the proposal itself
with a detailed explanation of the reasoning which dictated the
specific decisions evidenced by the language of the proposal. 8
II. THE REMEDIAL NEED
The major impetus to those who have accepted the idea of
a cooling-off period appears to have been a desire to check high-
pressure salesmanship. Historically, this desire may in part
stem from the thrust of the Molony Committee's report, which
urged a cooling-off period "because of its obvious value as a
check on the excesses of salesmanship."9 The Committee found
such excesses to be especially prevalent in the door-to-door sales
area' ° and thus decided against extending the remedy to retail
sales in general, thinking that such an extension would not be
"practicable."'" Additionally, the Committee found that "the
need for further protection [beyond that afforded by conven-
tional remedies] is not so marked in the case of persons who
go to shops or showrooms, presumably because of their self-in-
spired interest in the articles on display."12 In drafting the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code, the Uniform Commissioners appar-
ently also singled out high-pressure salesmanship as the main
reason for arming a certain class of consumers with a limited
right to cancel without justification.13 The Commissioners con-
curred with the Molony Committee in finding that "the sale in
the home is particularly susceptible to such methods."' 4
In contrast to the findings of the Committee and the Coin-
8. We will not discuss the fundamental efficacy of the cooling-
off period as a remedy, though this has been a question of considerable
controversy. Those desiring exposure to this aspect of the problem are
referred to Professor Sher's definitive and exhaustive work on the cool-
ing-off period in door-to-door sales. Sher, The "Cooling-Off" Period in
Door-to-Door Sales, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 717, 721-37 (1968). We concur
in the main with his conclusions in this regard.
9. MOLONY REPORT 172.
10. Id. at 243.
11. Id. at 173.
12. Id.
13. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.501, Comment 1. "An un-
derlying consideration for Part 5 is the belief that in a significant pro-
portion of such sales the consumer is induced to sign a sales contract
by high pressure techniques."
14. Id., Comment 2.
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mission, Professor Sher concluded that "[s] ince it is undisputed
that abusive selling practices can and do occur at stores and
showrooms, ... installments sales made at retail premises, as
well as those made in the home, should be subject to some sort
of cooling-off period."'15 In line with Professor Sher, the au-
thors reject the contention that the consumer's "self-inspired in-
terest"'81 in goods purchased on retail premises justifies a lesser
degree of protection. Even if it were true that those who pur-
chase in the traditional retail setting enter with a firm objective
in mind and consistently confine their purchases to the items
they initially desired, such idealized buyers can still be victim-
ized by high-pressure or deceptive tactics upon arrival. Addi-
tionally, in a world where all consumers hear the call of Madi-
son Avenue's ubiquitous siren songs, "self-inspired interest" may
indeed be a rare phenomenon.
As the authors see it, however, the main reason for extend-
ing this sort of remedy into the general retail sales area is simply
to provide a large number of consumers with a simple, inexpen-
sive and speedy remedy in all cases where they have been vic-
timized by defective products, dilatory delivery, deceptive or
high-pressure sales practices, or even their own stupidity. It
is clear, for example, that a consumer who buys a small appli-
ance which self-destructs on its maiden voyage is totally at the
mercy of the seller, who is then virtually free from legal retri-
bution. Theoretically, in sections 2-601 and 2-608 the Uniform
Commercial Code provides a self-help remedy in the form of
rejection of the non-conforming goods and revocation of accept-
ance.17 Putting aside for the moment the important question
of whether the consumer is even aware of these rights, one must
ask whether they are of any avail to the consumer who has
already paid for his purchase and is confronted with a refusal
to return his payment. Such a consumer must still resort to
litigation, with its attendant delay and inconvenience, to vindi-
cate his rights.
Litigation is not an economically feasible mechanism for
dealing with most consumer rights problems. The high cost
15. Sher, supra note 8, at 729.
16. MoLoNy REPORT 173.
17. It should be pointed out, however, that the application of these
sections to actual controversy is a subject fraught with confusion and
disagreement. See J. WHITE & R. SUMi.mRs, HANDBOOK OF T=E LAW
UNDER TH UNqIFOmw Co1nmMcrAL CODE 247-66 (1972) for a discussion
of the problems surrounding rejection and revocation of acceptance.
1974]
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of legal fees18 and the general denial of their recovery to success-
ful consumer litigants19 combine to shut the legal door in the
victim's face. As one commentator has observed, "today except
for lawsuits involving substantial amounts of money, the law
courts are no longer an effective or even feasible mechanism
for serving the great bulk of the needs of our citizens. '20 The
Molony Committee, though it did not pursue the idea to what
the authors consider to be its logical conclusion, recognized that
"[i] t is profitless to afford rights without conferring the rem-
edies necessary to support them."'21 This sort of legal duplicity
has long furnished critics of the legal system with ample am-
munition.22
What is needed then, is a simple, self-effectuating remedy
available to consumers on a broad basis. 23 Although by no
means a panacea for all the law's ills in this area, a generalized
cooling-off period is a step in the right direction. When the
buyer can return goods without cause for a limited period, a
great many of the problems discussed above are obviated. Hope-
fully, the very existence of such a right will provide the impetus
for improvements in sales techniques, advertising, product de-
sign and quality control.
Certainly, if one accepts the logic of extending the remedy
simply because it is necessary to provide consumers with a gen-
uinely effective remedy, there is no logical justification for lim-
18. Schrag, The Rights of Consumers, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS
128, 134 (N. Dorsen ed. 1970).
19. Id. at 134-35.
20. Jones, Wanted: A New System for Solving Consumer Griev-
ances, 25 ARB. J. (n.s.) 234, 235 (1970).
21. MOLONY REPORT 151.
22. The reader is directed, for example, to Ambrose Bierce's Dev-
ir's Dictionary definition of law (in fact a sad statement of what law
is not).
LAw, n.
Once Law was sitting on the bench,
And Mercy Knelt a-weeping.
"Clear out!" he cried, "disordered wench!
Nor come before me creeping.
Upon your knees if you appear,
'Tis plain you have no standing here."
Then Justice came. His Honor cried:
"Your status?-devil seize you!"
"Amica curiae," she replied-
"Friend of the court, so please you."
"Begone!" he shouted-"there's the door-
I never saw your face before!"
7 A. BIERcE, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ANMROSE BIEacE 186 (1911).
23. See Proposal § (1) in text accompanying note 35 infra.
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iting the remedy to door-to-door situations or installment sales.
The English Hire-Purchase Act of 1965, the child of the Molony
Committee's Report, applies only to sale agreements payable in
installments.24 Likewise, the coverage provided by the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code 5 is restricted to "consumer credit"
sales. 28
The authors can find no valid conceptual reason for distin-
guishing between cash and credit sales in this regard. It might
be argued that the limitation to credit sales excludes inconse-
quential transactions which, for one reason or another, do not
merit coverage. Clearly this purpose can be more satisfactorily
accomplished by a minimum-dollar-amount exclusion.- The ar-
gument has been made that "consumers who can afford to make
a lump sum payment possibly have less need for protection
against high-pressure selling than do less pecunious purchasers
who must rely on installment credit."28 While the validity of
this argument when viewed from the high-pressure sales per-
spective is doubtful, it is clearly erroneous from the perspective
of providing adequate remedies. A cash transaction need not
be a large one, and, as suggested above, the lower the price of
the goods involved, the more inadequate the conventional rem-
edies appear. The budgets of many families, not only those in
the lower income brackets, could well feel the impact of a 10
or 15 dollar loss.
- The most persuasive argument against extending a cooling-
off period to retail sales is simply that such an extension is im-
practical because of the large number of sales it would embrace
and the practical burdens it would place upon merchants. While
not denying that such an extension would place additional bur-
dens on merchants, the authors contend that careful drafting
can minimize these burdens. Provisions which operate to ex-
clude certain classes of sales from coverage, - deter frivolous re-
24. Hire-Purchase Act 1965, ch. 66, § 1(1).
25. UNIFoRM CONSmMER CREDIT CODE § 2.501.
26. "Consumer Credit Sale" is defined by § 2.104(l) of the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code as
[A] sale of goods, services, or an interest in land in which
(a) credit is granted by a person who regularly engages
as a seller in credit transactions of the same kind,[and]
"d) either the debt is payable in installments or a credit
service charge is made ....
27. See Proposal § (5) (a) in text accompanying note 35 infra.
28. Sher, supra note 8, at 744.
29. See Proposal § (5) in text accompanying note 35 infra.
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turns,3 0 place the onus of returning the goods upon the con-
sumer 3 1 and minimize the merchant's burden of giving notice
of the right to cancel3 2 should reduce the inconvenient effects
of the extension to tolerable levels. Moreover, were the perva-
sive acceptance of such a right to cancel to have a salutary effect
upon the quality of consumer transactions, the number of sit-
uations calling for the exercise of the right would decline. Fi-
nally, the cost of such a provision is not too great a price for
fairness in the marketplace and reduction of legal hypocrisy, es-
pecially inasmuch as, in the final analysis, it will be the con-
suming public who pays the cost via increased prices.
The authors are aware, however, that political realities may
relegate this proposal to that great dusty attic where so many
other "oughts" and "shoulds" reside. Certainly a legislature
which has balked at enacting a truncated cooling-off period will
not welcome a generalized one with open arms.
The following proposal is therefore drafted to fit the con-
text and style of the Uniform Commercial Code, not because
the authors envision ready acceptance by the Uniform Commis-
sioners and state legislatures, but because such a proposal is nec-
essary to fulfill the Code's implicit promise to the consumer of
fairness in commercial transactions. It would also seem that
an amendment of the Code would be the simplest means of
achieving the desired universality, should public and legislative
temperament become receptive to the adoption of a broad cool-
ing-off provision. Even so, the proposal is drafted in an inte-
grated manner so as to facilitate its adoption as an independent
piece of legislation, apart from the Code. Additionally, the de-
vice of fictionally integrating the proposal into the Code enabled
the authors to take advantage of the Code's extensive defini-
tional structure and its underlying obligation of good faith. '
It also, however, necessitates operation within the Code's limita-
tions, most importantly the exclusion of service transactions
from coverage by the proposal.3 4 While improvements are also
needed in the area of sales of services (just as Code principles
in general should be applied to sales of services), it is enough
at this juncture to recognize that the unique problems attendant
to that area probably merit separate and careful consideration.
30. Id. §§ (2), (4) (b).
31. Id. § (1) (a).
32. Id. § (3).
33. UNIFomv COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203.
34. Id. § 2-102.
[Vol. 58:753
RETAIL SALES
III. THE PROPOSAL: A BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL
WITHOUT CAUSE3 5
1) When a non-merchant buyer purchases consumer goods
from a merchant seller, the buyer may, without cause,
elect to cancel the transaction by delivering proper no-
tice to the seller by the close of seller's regular busi-
ness hours on the third full business day after the date
upon which the transaction was consummated or the
goods were delivered, whichever is later.
a) In the case of goods delivered at the seller's place
of business or mailed to a place other than the sell-
er's place of business, proper notice shall consist of
any manifestation of intent to cancel the transaction
accompanied by the return of the goods by the
buyer to the seller's place of business.
b) In the case of goods delivered to a place other than
the seller's place of business by means other than
mailing, proper notice shall consist solely of any
manifestation of intent to cancel the transaction.
Buyers giving notice pursuant to this subsection
shall cooperate with the seller in making reasonable
arrangements to allow the seller to take possession
of the goods, or forfeit their right to cancel without
cause.
c) Mailed notices and returns pursuant to this section
shall be effective when deposited with the United
States Postal Service properly addressed to the
seller with postage prepaid.
2) When a buyer exercises the right of cancellation pro-
vided by this section the seller shall, upon actual receipt
of the goods, immediately return to the buyer any con-
sideration received from the buyer together with any
evidence of the buyer's indebtedness the seller may pos-
sess; except that
a) the seller may retain as a cancellation fee five per-
cent (5%) of the cash price of the goods; and
b) if the goods have been installed the seller may, in
35. Should this Buyer's Right to Cancel Without Cause be adopted,
it is most easily integrated into the Uniform Commercial Code at the
end of article 2, part 7, Sales Remedies, although it might more logi-
cally follow U.C.C. § 2-711, Buyer's Remedies in General; Buyer's Se-
curity Interest in Rejected Goods.
1974]
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addition to the cancellation fee, retain any installa-
tion charge specifically assessed in the original
transaction.
3) The seller shall post a conspicuous notice of the buyer's
right to cancel at every location at which payment is
received at seller's place of business; or, in the case of
goods delivered or mailed to a place other than the sell-
er's place of business, notice shall accompany the goods.
a) The notice shall include
1) the conspicuous caption: "BUYER'S RIGHT TO
CANCEL"; and
2) a clear and concise statement of the buyer's basic
rights under this section; and
3) a listing of business hours sufficient to enable
the buyer to determine when his right to cancel
terminates; or in the case of a delivered notice,
the address to which notice of cancellation may
be sent.
b) The cancellation period provided by subsection (1)
shall not commence until the seller has complied
with the notice requirements of this subsection.
4) The buyer's right of cancellation provided by this sec-
tion
a) is absolute and shall prevail without penalty over
the rights of any assignee of the seller or any trans-
feree, holder, or holder in due course of any negotia-
ble instrument arising out of the original transac-
tion; and
b) shall also prevail against a secured party who re-
tains a purchase money security interest pursuant to
section 9-107(b). The security agreement may au-
thorize the secured party's retention of a finance can-
cellation fee of up to two percent (2%) of the
amount financed.
5) This section shall not apply to
-a) goods sold for less than ten dollars ($10.00); or
b) goods which cannot be returned to the seller in sub-
stantially as good condition as when received by the
buyer; or
c) goods which are to be specially manufactured for
the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in
the ordinary course of the seller's business.
[Vol. 58:753
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6) The seller shall forfeit the right to retain a cancellation
fee and stand liable to the buyer for attorneys' fees and
one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00) liquidated damages
whenever a seller shall unreasonably
a) refuse to allow a buyer to exercise the right to can-
cel provided by this section; or
b) fail to return any consideration received or evidence
of indebtedness as required by subsection (2).




In drafting this section, the initial issue 0 was whether to
cover the transactions of all sellers and buyers of goods as de-
fined by the Uniform Commercial Code.37 In view of the ra-
tionale previously advanced for extending a generalized cancella-
tion right, the case for granting such a right to professionals
who have some leverage as a result of a continuing sales rela-
tionship and who have relatively greater access to legal reme-
dies is less than compelling. The proposal therefore grants the
right only to buyers of consumer goods, that is, those bought
primarily for personal, family or household uses.as While there
are certainly cases of merchant and other non-consumer pur-
chasers who might benefit from the right to cancel without
cause, it is assumed that they are more capable of determining
their needs in advance and thus more able to benefit from ex-
isting remedies than are consumers. Furthermore, the potential
for speculative buying and cancelling if the price does not in-
crease is much greater if merchant buyers are included.30 Since
the "costs" '40 of a cancellation right must ultimately be spread
among all purchasers, it is difficult to justify increasing the costs
by extending the class of purchasers benefited to include those
not truly in need of such a right.
36. The following lengthy discussion of the details of the proposal
approximates the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code in pur-
pose, if not in form.
37. U=uIomv COMMnMCr=L CODE § 2-103(1) (a), (d).
'38. See id. § 9-109(1).
39. While a typical consumer might justifiably exercise the pre-
rogative of cancellation if the item is priced significantly lower else-
where, only merchants buying in quantity are likely to find it profit-
able to speculate on a continuing basis.
40. See note 45 infra and accompanying text.
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In distinguishing between merchant and non-merchant sell-
ers as well as merchant and non-merchant buyers, the proposal
adopts the logic underlying the Uniform Commercial Code.41 As
the obligations that the proposal creates would be a particularly
great burden on the occasional seller, the right of cancellation
does not apply in a transaction with a non-merchant seller. The
occasional seller does not have business hours, signs to post or
forms to present, nor can he spread additional cost over many
sales. Requiring him to resell an item implies the undertaking
of a whole new project, not simply a continuation of his ordi-
nary business of selling. And while a buyer from an occasional
seller may be just as naive or remedy-poor as one buying from
a merchant, or from one holding himself out as an expert, such
a buyer presumably will rely less upon the non-merchant sell-
er's expertise. In the typical case the buyer and the seller in-
volved in an occasional sale will likely be on equal terms. The
merchant-non-merchant distinction, as well as almost every
other distinction made in this proposal, is the result of a bal-
ancing of interests rather than a simple selection of a clearly
preferable choice. In recognition that most additional financial
burdens placed upon sellers are passed on to buyers, the pro-
posal attempts to limit the buyer's remedy when the costs of
cancellation are great or when the value of the right to cancel
is remote.
B. CANCELLATION FEE
Another fundamental question which confronted the authors
was whether the right to cancel should be absolute, or whether
the buyer who chooses to exercise the right should pay an addi-
tional fee above and beyond the general increase in prices which
might result from the enactment of the proposal.
1. Purpose
The proposal adopts a cancellation fee,42 a device designed
primarily to accomplish two goals. The first purpose of the can-
cellation fee is to inhibit purchasing with the intention of can-
cellation and to discourage totally frivolous returns. The diffi-
culty, of course, is that any such device will also discourage the
type of cancellation which the provision is designed to allow.
41. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-104, Comment 1.
42. For a typical cancellation provision, see UNIFORM CONSUMER
CREDIT CODE § 2.504(3).
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While hopefully cutting down on some cancellations that serve
no apparent function, the penalty fee requires that the buyer
whom the provision is intended to protect pay for his new right
and thus deters him from exercising the right to cancel in
wholly legitimate situations. The penalty fee, then, is again the
result of a somewhat uncomfortable balance. In the end, how-
ever, the need to deter frivolous purchases and cancellations out-
weighs the disadvantage of forcing the one exercising the right
to pay for it, an idea which in any case has some merit from
the standpoint of social economy.
An even more upsetting consequence of the fee is that retail
establishments that now freely allow cancellations may begin
to collect the cancellation fee. While there will be no compul-
sion to collect the fee, the very existence of the provision may
encourage and legitimize it. There seems to be no way of pre-
dicting the incidence of this practice because the good will gener-
ated by free returns may still be a strong motivating factor in
a retailer's decisions.43
The second purpose of the cancellation fee is to compensate
the seller for the costs incurred in processing the cancellation.
These might typically include the costs of inspecting, repackag-
ing and reshelving the item, as well as the record keeping in-
volved. Although the fee will ideally not go so far as to com-
pensate the merchant for his loss of profit, it will hopefully ap-
proximate a break-even situation." Since any actual expenses
that are not reimbursed are likly to be passed on to other buyers
in the form of higher prices, the provision of a cancellation fee
should act to minimize this cost of the proposal.5
The ideal cancellation fee is, of course, at once low enough
so as not to discourage legitimate returns nor to give a profit
43. The right of unlimited returns is an important factor in many
retail strategies. An example is catalog sales in which many consumers
will purchase goods unseen because they know that they can be re-
turned.
44. Inasmuch as most merchants will actually gain on some can-
cellations and lose on others and a few merchants may consistently gain
or lose, the five percent charge is intended to reach a balance as con-
sistently as such a fixed rate can.
45. Merchants are likely to treat any consistent losses resulting
from cancellations as just another cost of doing business to be passed
on to consumers to the fullest extent possible. Interestingly, however,
a merchant in a competitive market who experiences a proportionately
higher incidence of returns may not be able to pass on the cost by
raising his price. Such a situation would reward those sellers whose
product quality and selling techniques cause few cancellations.
19741
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to the seller and high enough to discourage frivolous returns
and to cover the seller's expenses.
2. Form and Amount
For simplicity, the proposal adopts a flat percentage of cash
price rather than any type of fixed or other varying dollar
amount. It is important that a buyer be able quickly and easily
to determine the cost of exercising his right.4 The five percent
figure is an intuitive choice; it has been utilized in analagous
legislation 47 and seems to strike the desired balance between the
interests of consumers and merchants. Although the five per-
cent cancellation fee may overcompensate sellers of very expen-
sive goods--$250 on a $5000 item covers quite a lot of paper
work and reshelving expense-the likelihood of a substantial loss
of profit on such goods renders a partial replacement of profit
less repugnant than in a more typical smaller sale. A ceiling
on the dollar value of goods covered is an obvious method of
preventing extreme cases of overcompensation. A ceiling of
$500, for example, would exempt those purchases that most peo-
ple make only rarely and usually with increased care.48 It can,
however, be postulated that a buyer is therefore less likely to
cancel such a sale without just cause, considering the large con-
cellation fee involved.
The most important consumer good falling into this high
cost category is the automobile. However, as in the sale of less
expensive goods, some right of cancellation is needed because
consumers are unable or unwilling to utilize existing legal rem-
edies. 49 Rather than calling for an upper dollar limit on can-
cellations, therefore, the proposal relies on higher penalty fees
to somewhat discourage concellation and to assuage the mer-
chants involved. An auto dealer might not be totally opposed
to receiving a several hundred dollar cancellation fee within
46. A 10 percent cancellation fee was given special consideration
because it was assumed that many consumers would find it simpler
to compute the 10 percent fee and therefore be more likely to make
a rational decision as to whether to cancel. Ten percent, however, did
not appear to strike the desired balance between the interests of con-
sumers and those of merchants.
47. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CoDE § 2.504(3).
48. A special consideration of the $500 amount is that under the
U.C.C. a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more
requires a writing. UNIFORM ComwmcrMEAL CODE § 2-201 (1).
49. Cf. Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case
Study of the Automobile Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 1006, 1007 (1968).
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three days of sale and then being able to sell the auto again. 50
In any case, the number of returns during a short cancellation
period is not likely to be great. In addition, some consumers
may wish to use cancellation in preference to conventional rem-
edies, judging the five percent fee less expensive than legal fees
and choosing an instant and certain refund over a remote and
uncertain recovery. 51 Such nonjudicial remedies, of course, rep-
resent a savings for all the parties involved.5 2
C. EXMPTooNs
1. Minimum Dollar Limit
The question of a minimum dollar limit is quite different
from that of a maximum one. First, the cancellation fee on
items costing under 10 dollars will often not cover the mer-
chant's costs of accepting and reselling those which have been
returned. In many cases, it may well be less expensive for the
merchant to discard the item than to repackage and resell it.
Although the exemption of small sales leaves the consumer with
virtually no other remedy to invoke, this compromise provision
assumes that the impact of a 10 dollar loss can be borne by
most families with tolerable repercussions. Second, the small
sales exemption should eliminate much of the proposal's nui-
sance potential for most merchants. Absent such an exemption,
a two or three cent cancellation fee would not provide much
of a deterrent to frivolous or malicious returns. Thus, by elim-
inating most retail sales by volume 5 it is hoped that the cancel-
lation right will be used on those sales which consumers most
regret end on those which likely involve less than ideal conduct
by sellers. The choice of the 10 dollar floor, again arbitrary,
was made because 50 cents seemed a fair minimum cancellation
fee and because sales of under 10 dollars seemed not to be of
critical importance.54
50. But see text accompanying notes 55-56 infra.
51. This quick recovery will be particularly attractive to the poor
who often cannot afford to have their money tied up during the months
or even years needed to pursue conventional remedies in the courts.
52. Increased reliance on such a nonjudicial remedy will also tend
to alleviate crowded court dockets.
53. While no statistics are compiled on what portion of retail sales
are of goods selling for less than 10 dollars, with food items alone it
certainly exceeds 50 percent.
54. The alternative of a 50 cent minimum cancellation fee, even
for small sales, is attractive because it allows cancellation of lower cost
items while adequately compensating merchants. This refinement was
19741
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2. Specially Manufactured Goods
Following the general philosophy of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code,55 goods which have been specially manufactured are
exempt from cancellation. This limitation is, obviously, in-
tended to protect a seller from being left with goods made to
the taste of the original buyer which would be difficult to resell.
Questions are likely to arise as to whether a particular good
has been specially manufactured-for example, whether an auto-
mobile purchased with air conditioning becomes exempt from
cancellation. However, by adopting the exact language of Uni-
form Commercial Code section 2-201(3) (a), the proposal should
obviate most definitional litigation. 6 Moreover, those ordering
unique goods are more likely to have considered carefully their
purchases than the conventional purchaser who buys "off the
shelf." The buyer's very act of specifying his particular needs
may tend to remove the normal reliance on a seller's war-
ranties.57
3. Damaged or Perishable Goods
Goods which the buyer has damaged by misuse cannot be
returned under the proposal. To allow cancellation in such cases
would leave the risk of loss with the seller after he has lost
control of the goods.58 The more troublesome question is how
to treat goods that are perishable or consumed in use. The 10
dollar floor fortunately excludes many such items, particularly
food. Although the arguments for allowing cancellation of the
sale of these items are no less persuasive than for goods gen-
erally, to guarantee the right to return partially consumed goods
puts the seller in the impossible position of having to refund,
without demonstrated cause, 95 percent of the price and receive
little or nothing in return. There seems to be no feasible alter-
native to the exemption of goods that have deteriorated or been
consumed.
rejected, however, to keep the scheme as simple as possible and thereby
to enable it to be widely and fully understood.
55. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201 (3) (a).
56. While the implication of the term "specially manufactured
goods" is somewhat different from that in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-201 (3) (a), the answer to the question of what constitutes such
goods is the same and has had many years to develop.
57. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, Comment 9.
58. A question may arise in the case of damaged goods as to
whether the damage was caused by the buyer or by a defect in the




4. Goods Which Cannot Be Resold as New
The general expectation is that any item which can be re-
turned can be resold as new after repackaging and minor adjust-
ments. If the items cannot be remarketed as new, it fails the
test of being in substantially as good condition as when received
by the buyer.59 There seems to be no practical alternative to
requiring the buyer of these items to rely on conventional, and
often unsatisfactory, legal remedies.
A few consumer oriented statutes have been enacted to limit
a merchant's right to resell used goods as new.60  Jurisdictions
having such provisions may have to redraft them to allow the
resale of goods returned pursuant to the proposal's provisions
in order to maximize consumer protection. That the provisions
of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code allowing analogous can-
cellation and return in direct sales"' have apparently caused no
problems may indicate that the conflict is unlikely to be signifi-
cant.
5. "As is" Sales
There is no provision for the exemption of sales made on
an "as is" basis.62 It is assumed that many purchasers would
not understand what the term means and that some sellers
would attempt to circumvent the operation of the proposal by
selling all goods "as is". While this view may appear somewhat
inconsistent with the existing Code provision on "as is" goods
as they relate to warranties, the two situations are actually quite
different. The inability to exclude implied warranties might de-
ter the sale of old or damaged goods where the potential war-
ranty expense greatly exceeds a reduced sale price. With re-
turned goods, on the other hand, there is no potential warranty
expense. Sellers will no doubt be inconvenienced whenever
goods are returned after a short sale or special offering; how-
ever, allowing the return of "as is" goods should cause no special
pioblems in addition to this inconvenience.
59. State laws on the return of personal items such as underwear
may limit somewhat the scope of the cancellation privilege.
60. See, e.g., MNN. STAT. § 325.772(6) (Supp. 1973).
61. See UNIFORM CoNsumvm CaRDrr CODE § 2.502 (5) (b).
62. The Uniform Commercial Code exempts "as is" sales from im-





Under the Uniform Commercial Code if the transaction is
predominately a sale of goods, the entire price is generally con-
sidered to be the cost of the goodsY3 It would seem unreason-
able, however, for the seller to be required to refund that part
of the purchase price which comprises installation charges.
Therefore, the proposal permits the seller to retain, upon can-
cellation and after installation of the goods, any installation
charge specifically noted in the original transaction. Moreover,
many installed goods, such as carpeting, will be exempted as
goods which cannot be returned in resalable condition.0 4 The
installation charge provision is another compromise that will no
doubt displease both buyers and sellers. Buyers may receive
substantially less than 95 percent of the total price, and sellers
will have to remove installed goods without compensation.
2. Notice of the Cancellation Right
Clearly, the proposal is meaningless if those it intends to
benefit are not effectively apprised of its existence and terms.
Perhaps the most certain method of informing the buyer of his
right to cancel would be to require a written reaffirmation of
purchase before a sale is considered final. 0 Other methods of
notice include mailing a cancellation form to the purchaser 0 and
giving notice of the right to cancel with each purchase.0 7 Al-
though effective, these methods are expensive and arguably not
only allow cancellation but encourage it.68 The right to return
goods is such a basic right that, if broadly adopted, it will be
easily understood and remembered. In addition, it is anticipated
that a great deal of publicity would accompany the recognition
of such a fundamental new right. Thus it appears sufficient
63. While not all authorities and courts have been clear and con-
sistent on this question, this does appear to be the majority rule. See
generally Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Sup. 109, 197 A.2d 342
(1963); Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971); 2 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 475 (1950); 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 508, 509, 509A
(3d ed. 1960).
64. See, e.g., the discussion of specially manufactured goods in text
accompanying note 55 supra.
65. See, e.g., MODEL CONSUMER CREDrr ACT § 2.703.
66. See, e.g., Hire-Purchase Act of 1965, ch. 66, §§ 9(3)-(4), 11.
67. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 476-5(e) (1968) (house-to-house
sales).
68. The issue is discussed in Sher, The "Cooling-Off" Period in
Door-to-Door Sales, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 717, 730-32 (1968).
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to require the permanent posting of a notice 0 of the right at
each cash register on the seller's premises and to require actual
presentation of the notice only when delivery is not made at
the seller's place of 'business.70 Should this scheme of notice
prove insufficient, one of the more direct methods should be
adopted.
3. The Three-day Period
Another product of compromise, the limitation of the cool-
ing-off period to three full days was borrowed from the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code.7 1 The seller must at some point have
assurance that the sale will not be cancelled without cause, and
yet, depending on the type of item and the type of sale, the
purchaser must have enough time to make an intelligent deci-
sion on cancellation. In a parade of horribles, one can envision
the vacationer who returns home a week after the purchase only
to find the item will not fit through the doorway. Although
the limitation thus may treat some meritorious claimants
harshly, a line had to be drawn; the proposal opts for simplicity
over precision. The three days is measured from the later of
sale or delivery so that the purchaser will actually have the
goods for at least three days before he must reach a decision
on cancellation.7
2
If delivery is made at the merchant's place of business, can-
cellation must be made by returning the goods to that place.
While this may cause some hardship for those who wish to can-
cel, particularly travelers, any other scheme would be unfair to
the typical merchant who makes all his sales over the counter.
If the goods are delivered by mail, cancellation may be made
by returning the goods in the mail. If the seller delivers the
goods, they will in many instances be large items the return
of which the buyer might find difficult to arrange within the
three-day period. While the proposal puts an extra financial
burden on the seller by requiring him to pick up such goods,
69. A type of posting has been required under the Economic Sta-
bilization Program. See 6 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1974).
70. An unresolved problem is the effective communication of this
information to illiterate or non-English speaking buyers.
71. UNIFom CONSuaUR CarDrr CODE § 2.502(1).
72. The effective time period in which a consumer may cancel will
vary greatly because of the three full business day requirement. That
is, if a store is closed on the weekend, a purchase made on Friday morn-
ing could be cancelled up until closing time the following Wednesday.
This imprecision is another cost of the desired simplicity.
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many of these items can be expected to be costly enough that
the five percent fee will defray a portion of the extra cost.
4. The Buyer's Notice Requirement
The buyer need use no special form of notice to cancel. The
return of the goods signifies cancellation, and if notice is to be
given apart from return, as in the case of goods to be picked
up by the seller, any manifestation of intent to cancel will suf-
fice.78
The Uniform Commercial Credit Code has again been fol-
lowed in making mailed notices and returns effective upon
proper mailing,74 thus placing the burden of lost or late mail
on the seller. The rationale of this mailing provision rests upon
the judgment that forcing a seller to accept a late return is less
offensive than depriving a buyer of the right to return. And,
although requiring that mailed notices be sent by certified mail
would eliminate most proof problems created by this rule, such
a requirement would present too great a barrier to unsophisti-
cated consumers.7 5
5. Cooperation by Seller and Buyer
The cancellation right would be of little value if the seller,
by simply refusing to allow the cancellation, could force the
buyer to rely on conventional remedies to compel compliance.
While it is -anticipated that most merchants will quickly accept
the consumer's right of cancellation as a normal aspect of con-
ducting business, the proposal provides an additional incentive.
Any seller shown to have unreasonably denied a buyer's right
to cancel loses the cancellation fee, is assessed 150 dollars in liq-
uidated damages and must pay the consumer's attorney's fees. 0
The liquidated damages should act as an incentive to sue, and
the provision of attorney's fees should assist in making counsel
73. The authors recognize that not requiring a written cancellation
will create problems of proof, particularly if one party is operating in
bad faith. Problems of proof, however, would not be totally eliminated
by requiring written cancellation, and such a requirement would make
cancellation more difficult for the unsophisticated buyer.
74. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.502 (3).
75. See Sher, supra note 68, at 764.
76. In cases in which a question arises as to whether to allow can-
cellation, the seller initially determines the outcome. The liquidated
damages and attorney's fees provisions will encourage the seller to act




available. There will, of course, still be many wronged consum-
ers who are too unsophisticated or unmotivated to pursue this
remedy by litigation. It will suffice, however, if enough liti-
gants pursue their remedies to discourage merchants from sys-
tematically denying buyers' rights of cancellation.
In the case where the merchant must pick up the goods from
the buyer, the buyer, too, must fully cooperate by facilitating
the pickup or forfeit the right to canceL Clearly, a vengeful
buyer should not be granted the boon of cancellation while frus-
trating the merchant's right to regain possession of his prop-
erty.
6. Financing Consumer Purchases
The final and perhaps most complex group of problems
arises in integrating the right to cancel with the financing of
consumer purchases. When the merchant finances the sale and
retains a security interest, the provision operates much like it
would in a cash sale. The seller refunds the down payment,
minus five percent of the full cash price, and returns the note
to the buyer. There would seem to be no valid reason to limit
the cancellation right simply because the seller accepts a note
rather than cash.
A more difficult problem arises if the note is negotiated
to a holder or holder in due course. While the holder in due
course doctrine is justifiably under attack in many jurisdic-
tions,77 the proposal simply makes the three-day right to cancel
good against anyone, even a holder in due course. To provide
otherwise would make the right too easily defeasible. The prob-
able result of this subsection will be that notes will not be nego-
tiated until the cooling-off period has expired. While perhaps
inconvenient, this delay in negotiation should not create a sig-
nificant burden on sellers.78
The one situation in which a simple cancellation would be
inequitable is when a finance company or other lender provides
the cash for the purchase of consumer goods and takes a pur-
chase money security interest in the goods.70 It would seem
77. See Comment, Abolishing Holder in Due Course in Oregon
Consumer Transactions: Legal and Economic Consequences, 52 ORE L.
Rzv. 461 (1973).
78. A potential holder in due course could, of course, purchase the
note immediately and upon cancellation rely on the seller of the goods
to refund what was paid for the note.
79. See UNz0RMv CONMCImAL CODE § 9-107 (b).
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unfair to leave such a true "outsider" totally uncompensated if
a sale is cancelled. The proposal, therefore, provides that while
cancellation does terminate such a purchase money security in-
terest, the lender may retain up to two percent of the amount
financed. This two percent fee will further discourage the exer-
cise of the right of cancellation, but seems necessary if for no
other reason than to mollify lenders who would otherwise assert
that the adoption of the proposal would lead to the elimination
of this form of consumer credit. What remains to be seen is
whether the existence of such an exception would greatly foster
the interlocking sale and loan method of financing. With this
method a merchant regularly sends consumers in need of credit
to a particular lender instead of financing the sale himself or
subsequently discounting the consumer's note to the same
lender. Clearly the exception should not apply to one who is,
in reality, an "insider" to the transaction.
The authors have drafted the suggested "Buyer's Right to
Cancel Without Cause" to be easily understood and exercised
by buyers and accepted by merchants as a uniform and inex-
pensive means of dealing with a variety of consumer complaints.
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